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NOTES
RIGHTS OF THE SOLIDARY SURETY: LOUISIANA
BANK & TRUST CO. v. BOUTTE
Claiming the balance due on several promissory notes,
a creditor bank sued the corporate maker of the notes and
four shareholders who had signed a "continuing guaranty"
agreement and by the terms of the agreement had bound
themselves in solido with the principal debtor. Before trial,
the creditor bank released the principal debtor and three of
the shareholders through compromise agreements that in-
volved a transfer of their property to the bank. The remain-
ing defendant, against whom the bank had reserved its
rights, contended that the guaranty agreement obligated him
as a surety and that he was discharged by the release of the
principal debtor and the creditor's acceptance of the debtor's
property. Rejecting his argument, the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that a compromise and release of the principal
debtor, in which the creditor reserves his rights against a
surety, is insufficient to discharge a surety who has bound
himself in solido with the principal debtor since the surety's
obligation is governed by the rules of the Louisiana Civil
Code regulating ordinary solidary obligors. Louisiana Bank
and Trust Co. v. Boutte, 309 So. 2d 274 (La. 1975).
Suretyship is a contract governed by the provisions of the
Louisiana Civil Code.1 The suretyship contract is distinct
from the contract between a creditor and debtor 2 and is con-
stituted by the accessory promise of the surety to the creditor
to perform the obligation of the principal debtor upon the
principal debtor's default.3 Being accessory, a surety's obliga-
tion presupposes the existence of an underlying principal ob-
ligation4 and ceases upon the extinction of that obligation.5
1. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3035-70. A "guaranty" in Louisiana has tradition-
ally been interpreted as subject to suretyship rules. Brock v. First State
Bank, 187 La. 766, 175 So. 569 (1937); Citizen's Bank & Trust Co. v. Barthet,
177 La. 652, 148 So. 906 (1933); Lachman v. Block, 47 La. Ann. 505, 17'So. 153
(1894). But see La. & N.W.R.R. v. Dillard, 5 La. Ann. 1484, 26 So. 451 (1899).
2. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 1771 with-arts. 3035-36 and 3038.
3. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3035.
4. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1771, 3035; Andrus v. Chretien, 3 La. 48 (1831); 4
AUBRY & RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 304 (6th ed. Bartin 1942) in A. YIAN-
NOPOULOS, 1 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 91 (1965) [hereinafter cited as AUBRY
& RAU]; 2 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 2, no. 2324(2) at 336 (11th ed.
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Payment by the debtor,6 prescription of the debtor's obliga-
tion,7 remission by the creditor to the debtor,8 compromise, 9
novation,10 and compensation' of the debtor's obligation, and
defenses "inherent in the debt' '1 2 are available as defenses to
a surety. Furthermore, since the debt is not his, if the surety
pays the creditor, he is entitled to recourse against the debt-
or 3 and subrogation to all of the creditor's rights and collat-
eral security interests pertaining to the debt. 14 If a creditor
La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959) [hereinafter cited as PLANIOL]; 2 R. POTHIER,
OBLIGATIONS pt. 2 § 6 at 195 (3rd American ed. Evans trans. 1853) [hereinaf-
ter cited as POTHIER]; R. SLOVENKO, TREATISE ON CREDITOR'S RGHTS UNDER
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW 3-4 (1968) [hereinafter cited as SLOVENKO]; Hubert,
The Nature and Essentials of Conventional Suretyship, 13 TUL. L. REV. 519,
521 [hereinafter cited as Hubert]; Note, 15 LA. L. REV. 865 (1955). See 1 S.
LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 111 in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 195
(1969).
5. This result can be inferred from LA. CIV. CODE art. 3060 which pro-
vides that a surety may assert against the creditor all defenses "inherent to
the debt." Consequently, LA. Civ. CODE art. 2205 dictates that release of the
principal entails release of the surety, but the converse is not true. The
benefit of any transaction between a creditor and debtor accrues to the
surety "because his obligation is only an accessory to that of the principal
debtor." LA. CIV. CODE art. 3076. See Dickson v. Bell, 13 La. Ann. 249 (1858)
(judgment relieving principal relieves surety); Citizen's Bank v. Dugue, 5 La.
Ann. 12 (1850) (release of the maker of a note releases the surety); Freeland
v. Briscoe, 3 La. Ann. 255 (1848) (when principal's indebtedness does not exist
neither does surety's); Shields v. Brundige, 4 La. 326 (1832) (prescription of
the principal obligation extinguishes the accessory); Andrus v. Chretien, 3
La. 48 (1831) (there can be no accessory obligation apart from the principal
obligation); AUBRY & RAU § 304 at 92; 2 PLANIOL nos. 2369-70 at 351; POTHIER
p. 2 c. 6 § 1 at 300, 306; Hubert at 521. This result is clearly illustrated in the
analogous situation of mortgage. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3284-85.
6. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 2134 with art. 3060. This result is also
fairly obvious because of the surety's promise to pay only if the debtor does
not.
7. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3553.
8. Id. art. 2205.
9. Id. art. 3076.
10. Id. art. 2198.
11. Id. art. 2211.
12. Id. art. 3060.
13. Id. arts. 3052-53. This recourse, sometimes called the personal action
of the surety, is based either upon mandatum, when the surety is engaged at
the request of the debtor, or upon negotiorum gestio when the debtor does not
acknowledge the surety's contract. This action allows recovery of principal,
interest, and costs from the day of payment. 2 PLANIOL pt. 2 nos. 2353-60.
14. The surety paying the debt is also entitled to legal subrogation as one
"bound with others, or for others" with an interest in payment of the debt.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2161(3). Legal subrogation invests the surety with all
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does not preserve intact the rights and security interests to
which a surety may become subrogated, 5 accepts the debtor's
property in payment, 6 or grants an extension to the debtor,17
the Louisiana Civil Code discharges the surety to the extent
that he is prejudiced, in effect imposing an obligation upon
the creditor and imparting to the contract a bilateral na-
ture. 8
In addition to having the defenses inherent in the bilat-
eral and accessory nature of the suretyship contract, a surety
is protected by the devices of discussion' s and division. 20 Be-
fore payment, he may demand that the creditor discuss
(seize) the debtor's property,2' and if obligated along with
other sureties, he may require that the creditor's demand
against him be divided (reduced to his pro rata share) among
the solvent sureties.22
rights, privileges, mortgages, and accessory guarantees of the original cred-
itor. 2 PLANIOL pt. 2 nos. 2353-60.
15. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3061; Hereford v. Chase, 1 Rob. 212 (La. 1841);
Walters Air Cond. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 919 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1971).
16. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3062.
17. Id. art. 3063; Allison v. Thomas, 29 La. Ann. 732 (1877); Calliham v.
Tanner, 3 Rob. 299 (La. 1842); Millaudon v. Arnous, 3 Mart. (N.S.) 596 (La.
1825). However, to operate as a discharge, the extension must be a binding
agreement that will prejudice the surety rather than a mere forbearance.
Elmore v. Robinson, 18 La. Ann. 651 (1866); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Richard 209 So. 2d 95 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968). In any case, the surety's
discharge under this article only takes place pro tanto. Gosserand v. Lacour,
8 La. Ann. 75 (1853).,
18. The articles of the Louisiana Civil Code dealing with suretyship can
be traced through the Code Napoleon to the different Roman forms of sure-
tyship. 2 PLANIOL pt. 2 nos. 2316, 2383. One of these Roman forms was the
mandatum pecuniae credendae, an application of the contract of mandate
which came to be widely used because of its advantages to the surety. Unlike
fideiussio, the simple unilateral form of suretyship, mandatum pecuniae cre-
dendae was a synallagmatic contract which obligated the mandatory (cred-
itor) to preserve his rights and securities against the debtor. The mandator
(surety) was released from his obligation to indemnify the mandatory (cred-
itor) if any of the rights or securities had been lost or abandoned by the
latter. W. BUCKLAND, A TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 308, 324-28 (2d ed. rev.
1965). Suretyship has, in the Louisiana Civil Code, some bilateral aspects-
the obligations imposed by the mandatum pecuniae credendae. See LA. CIV.
CODE arts. 3061-63; Amory v. Boyd, 5 Mart. (O.S.) 414 (La. 1818); 2 PLANIOL
pt. 2 nos. 2324(1), 2382-84.
19. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3045-46.
20. Id. art. 3049.
21. Id. arts. 3045-46.
22. Id. art. 3049.
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The essence of the surety's contract is its accessory na-
ture; all suretyship contracts are accessory. 23 Therefore,
every contract of suretyship is extinguished upon the extinc-
tion of the principal obligation. If a contract may not be
characterized as accessory, it is not a contract of suretyship
though so denominated.
However, those conditions 24 that confer upon the surety-
ship contract its bilateral nature may be modified by an
agreement between the surety and the creditor without alter-
ing the accessory nature of the suretyship contract. 25 Simi-
larly, the exceptions of discussion and division may not only
be waived, but are lost if not specifically pleaded upon the
creditor's institution of suit against the surety.28
Discussion and division are also denied to the surety if he
is bound in solido with the principal debtor;27 Louisiana Civil
Code article 304528 expressly denies the right of discussion to
the surety bound in solido with the debtor, and division is
inimical to the essential nature of solidarity, i.e., the cred-
itor's ability to collect the entire amount from any party
solidarily bound.29
In commercial practice a surety often binds himself in
solido with the debtor, but the precise nature of such a mod-
23. The accessory nature is of the "essence of the contract, for want
whereof there is no contract at all, or a contract of another description," LA.
CIV. CODE art. 1764(1), since (1) suretyship is defined as an "accessory prom-
ise," LA. CIv.. CODE art. 3035, (2) contracts are either principal or accessory
"in relation to their substance," LA. CIv. CODE art. 1767, and (3) suretyship is
an accessory contract since its object is to insure the performance of a
previous contract, LA. Civ. CODE art. 1771.
24. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3061-63. See text at note 18, supra.
25. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1764(2).
26. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3046, 3049.
27. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. Succession of Cancienne, 140 La. 969, 74
So. 267 (1917); Edward Bruce Co. v. Lambour, 123 La. 969, 49 So. 659 (1909);
McCausland v. Lyons, 4 La. Ann. 273 (1849); New Orleans Canal & Banking
Co. v. Escoffie, 2 La. Ann. 830 (1847); Smith v. Scott, 3 Rob. 258 (1842);
Thibodeau v. Patin, 1 Mart. (N.S.) 478 (La. 1823); Etzberger v. Menard, 11
Mart. (O.S.) 434 (La. 1822); Aston v. Morgan, 2 Mart. (O.S.) 336 (La. 1812).
28. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3045: "The obligation of the surety towards the
creditor is to pay him in case the debtor should not himself satisfy the debt;
and the property of such debtor is to be previously discussed or seized, unless
the security should have renounced the plea of discussion, or should be bound
in solido jointly with the debtor, in which case the effects of his engagement
are to be regulated by the same principles which have been established for
debtors in solido."
29. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2091-94.
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ified suretyship contract has been difficult for the courts to
articulate. Article 3045 provides that when a surety does sol-
idarily bind himself with the debtor, "the effects of his en-
gagement are to be regulated by the same principles which
have been. established for debtors in solido." Because the
principles of solidarity to which the article makes reference
do not expressly mention the discharges available to a surety
by reason of the bilateral and accessory nature of his con-
tract, one might argue that the effect of solidarity would be to
deprive the surety of those rights. Some Louisiana cases have
rejected such an expansive interpretation, viewing the basic
contractual implications of suretyship as unaffected by sol-
idarity except to the extent that they are incompatible with
the explicit language of article 3045 or the essential nature of
solidarity.3° Other cases, however, have seemingly construed
article 3045 and the effect of solidarity as bases for the
treatment of the solidary surety as an ordinary solidary co-
obligor.3 1
30. Alter v. Zunts, 27 La. Ann. 317 (1875); Succession of Daigle, 15 La.
Ann. 594 (1860); Jones v. Fleming, 15 La. Ann. 522 (1860); Adle v. Metoyer, 1
La. Ann. 254 (1846). Cf. Brewer v. Foshee, 189 La. 220, 179 So. 87 (1938).
In Adle, supra, a creditor extended time to the debtor without the sure-
tyis consent. The surety was discharged. The court specifically rejected the
argument that the surety in solido could not maintain the defenses of surety-
ship and implicitly the argument of defense counsel that while solidarity
might broaden the liability of a surety it left intact his rights as a surety.
Jones v. Fleming, supra, arrived at a similar interpretation, reasoning that if
the articles which granted the surety such rights had required exception,
they, like article 3045, would have contained them.
31. Bonart v. Rabito, 141 La. 970, 76 So. 166 (1917); American Bank &
Trust Co. v. Blue Bird Restaurant & Lounge, 279 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1973); Central Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Oil Field Supply & Scrap Material
Co., 12 So. 2d 815 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942); Elmer Candy Co. v. Bauman, 150 So.
427 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933). Bonart, supra, construed the cumulative effect of
LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3045 and 2106 as denying the benefit of LA. CIV. CODE art.
3063 (see text at note 17, supra) to the solidary surety since "a person may be
only a surety as to his co-obligor in solido and at the same time be liable
primarily to the common creditor." 141 La. at 986, 76 So. at 174. The court in
the instant case relied upon Bonart as authority to disregard Jones v. Flem-
ing, 115 La. Ann. 522 (1860). The conclusion in Bonart from LA. CIV. CODE
arts. 3045 and 2106 is dicta and does not in any case compel the treatment of
the surety as a principal. Bonart involved the liability of an endorser of a
negotiable note. Primary liability towards the holder of a negotiable note
means simply that there are no conditions precedent to the holder's execu-
tion against the party primarily liable, and is not equivalent to liability as a
principal since a party may still be a surety or "accommodation party" en-
titled to suretyship defenses. LA. R.S. 10:3-415 (1975). As in the instant case,
1975]
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In the instant case, the Louisiana Supreme Court, fol-
lowed the rationale of the latter cases in interpreting the
cumulative, effect of articles 3045 and 2106.32 Article 2106
provides that solidary co-debtors may be interested or unin-
terested in the debt and therefore, among themselves, enti-
tled to varying amounts of contribution. Under this article,
one co-debtor may even be entitled to full recourse against
the other, and this possibility suggests a similarity to the
surety's right of recourse for the whole amount of the debt.
However, Article 2106 seems to limit this suretyship-like ef-
fect to the relation of the debtors themselves and exclude any
effects upon the creditor. The court apparently concluded, on
the basis of this article, that actual suretyship involving sol-
idarity should be limited in the same way since, although the
court stated that the "legal classifications ... of surety and
solidary obligor are not mutually exclusive, ' '3 3 it concluded
that "as between the creditor and the solidary surety, the
obligations of the surety are governed by the rules of solidary
obligors." Accordingly, the court applied the provisions of
the Civil Code that determine the effect of a compromise upon
an ordinary solidary co-debtor, 35 rather than the provision
that specifically regards sureties when the creditor has com-
promised with the principal. 36 Further, the court indicated
that the solidary surety would not be entitled to a discharge
upon acceptance of property by the creditor in payment of the
where the contract derives from a separate agreement rather than a mere
indorsement, Bonart becomes particularly inapplicable.
Blue Bird and Oil Field were handled differently by the Louisiana Su-
preme Court. In Oil Field, 12 So. 2d 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942), an endorser,
although primarily liable under the Bonart holding, was entitled to the
preservation of securities given with the note, and in the absence of them
due to the holder's fault, was discharged to the same extent. A narrower
reading of Bonart is possible, and would leave the solidary surety's rights
under LA. CIV. CODE art. 3061 intact. Blue Bird, supra, is discussed at note
40, infra.
32. Louisiana Bank & Trust Co. v. Boutte, 309 So. 2d 274, 277-78 (La.
1975). LA. CIV. CODE art. 2106 provides: "If the affair for which the debt has
been contracted in aolido concern only one of the co-obligors in solido, that
one is liable for the whole debt towards the other co-debtors, who, with
regard to him, are considered only as his securities."
33. Louisiana Bank & Trust Co. v. Boutte, 309 So. 2d 274; 277 (La. 1975).
34. Id. at 278.
35. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3077.
36. Id. art. 3076.
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debt as would a simple surety under article 3062. 37 The net
effect of the court's treatment of the solidary surety is to
make him a principal co-obligor 3 as a legal effect of his sol-
idarity regardless of the nature of his agreement itself. This
result is not supported by the Louisiana Civil Code, because
articles 3045 and 2106 do not necessarily exclude all of the
effects of the contract of suretyship between a creditor and a
solidary surety.
Article 2106 does not address solidary suretyship; like the
other code articles regulating the effects of solidarity, it pre-
supposes that a co-debtor in solido has contracted with the
creditor as a principal interested in the debt. Since the co-
debtor in solido has normally contracted with the creditor
that the debt is to some extent his, article 2106 implies that if,
in fact, he is not interested in the principal debt, he can
assert his lack of interest only against his co-debtor in so-
lido.39 Article 2106 is not applicable in any way to a solidary
37. Louisiana Bank & Trust Co. v. Boutte, 309 So. 2d 274, 279-80 (La.
1975).
38. This result could have been reached on grounds other than the ef-
fects of solidary suretyship. The language of the instrument alone might
have disposed of the defendant's assertion that he was a surety. Defendant
expressly granted the right to "grant releases and discharges" and made
himself a party to all of the obligations of the principal as if contracted in
person. Under these circumstances the description of the instrument as a
"guaranty" should not have obscured its nature as a principal undertaking.
Justice Barham's concurrence emphasizes the importance of assessing the
instrument itself. In his view, "all of the defendants were principal co-
obligors." 309 So. 2d at 288. This approach was utilized in a recent case
involving a similar relationship. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Blue Bird
Restaurant & Lounge, 279 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973), aff'd, 290 So. 2d
302 (1974). The opinion of the appellate court in Blue Bird had responded to
the guarantor's contention of release through the provisions of LA. CIV. CODE
art. 3063 by noting that he had explicitly granted to the bank the right to
grant extensions without his consent. 279 So. 2d 720, 724. But the opinion
went on to cite Bonart to the effect that, as a solidary surety, the defendant
was not entitled to the benefit in any case. 279 So. 2d at 724. All through the
appellate court's discussion the defendant was treated as a surety. The
supreme court, on the other hand, nowhere in its opinion considered the
defendant as a surety. The defendant was bound as a principal through the
effect of his agreement. His contention of release under article 3063 was
futile because of his express waiver of any right possibly accruing thereun-
der. 290 So. 2d 302, 306.
39. This article does not unequivocally exclude the assertion of an unin-
terested party's rights against the creditor. The phrase "with regard to him
(the principal debtor]" does not necessarily insulate the creditor from the
19751
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surety, who by denominating himself as a surety, has rep-
resented to the creditor that he is not at all interested in the
principal debt. 40
Moreover, although Louisiana Civil Code article 3045 does
provide that the effects of the solidary surety's engagement
are regulated by the principles of solidarity, these principles
do not require that the accessory4 ' and bilateral nature42 of
the surety's contract be ignored. Solidarity is merely a clas-
sification independent of whether the contract is principal or
accessory. 43 The substance of the contract itself determines
its nature as principal or accessory, while solidarity is, in the
language of the Louisiana Civil Code, only an accidental
stipulation." Whenever solidarity is introduced into a con-
tract it should conform to the nature of the contract which is
the source of the obligation. 45
Many of the articles of the Louisiana Civil Code that
treat the solidary co-debtor to some extent as a principal
recognize that he is to the same extent an accessory. Thus
article 2203,46 which provides that the creditor may release
effects of suretyship. It merely makes clear that the article is applicable to
contribution and the relationship between the debtors. Suretyship is a con-
tract not between the debtor and the surety, but between the creditor and
the surety. Even should article 2106 be interpreted as an implied limitation
upon the effects of suretyship, its purpose might well be to indicate that such
sureties should not enjoy the benefits of discussion and division, rather than
to negate their nature as sureties entirely.
40. On occasion, the jurisprudence has correctly recognized that LA.
CIV. CODE art. 2106 contemplates the situation of an uninterested third party
bound in solido as a principal obligor and who is therefore entitled to full
recourse against his co-debtor but not accorded the special benefits of surety-
ship. See, e.g., Moriarty v. Bagnetto, 110 La. 598, 34 So. 701 (1903); Walker v.
Delahoussay, 116 So. 2d 884 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959).
41. 6 AUBRY ET RAU, Daorr CIVIL FRANQAIS n° 423 at 271 (6th ed. 1946)
[hereinafter cited as AUBRY ET RAU]: "The solidarity which the surety can
assume does not relieve him of the character of his engagement as an acces-
sory" (author's translation). Id. Slovenko states, "The subsidiary character
of suretyship exists even in the case of solidary surety." SLOVENKO at 30. See
Hubert at 521. Cf. Hubert at 523.
42. AUBRY ET RAU no 423 at 271, n° 429 at 301-02; PLANIOL at nos. 2352,
2383-84; SLOVENKO at 72. See Note, 49 TUL. L. REV. 1187 (1975) (succint yet
thorough assessment of the French doctrinal and jurisprudential position on
this matter).
43. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1995-96.
44. Id. arts. 1764(3), 1995-96.
45. See id. art. 1760.
46. Id. art. 2203: "The remission or conventional discharge in favor of one
of the co-debtors in solido, discharges all the others, unless the creditor has
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one of the co-debtors in solido yet reserve his rights against
the other, treats the remaining co-debtor as a principal only
with regard to his part of the debt. He is discharged from the
released debtor's part precisely as if he had been an accessory
or surety for that part.47 The Civil Code articles on solidarity
also expressly permit that one of the debtors may be "obliged
differently." 48 Thus if one co-debtor should stipulate with the
creditor that his obligation is contingent upon the existence
of the principal obligation of the other co-debtor, and the
creditor's preservation of the other securities, there is no
reason why such a contract, though solidary, should not be
enforceable. Likewise, the surety who has by the nature of
his contract itself stipulated both that he has no part in the
debt and that his obligation will be contingent, should remain
undisturbed in the enjoyment of those provisions even
though he becomes solidarily bound.49
expressly reserved his right against the latter. In the latter case, he can not
claim the debt without making deduction of the part of him to whom he has
made the remission."
47. Similarly, LA. CIV. CODE art. 3077, which seems to allow the creditor
to compromise with one of the solidary co-debtors independently of the others
and without releasing them, must be read in the light of LA. CIV. CODE art.
2100, which provides that the division of the debt necessary to effect a
compromise with only one party operates a release of others to the extent of
the share of the compromising party.
48. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2092.
49. Convincing support for this argument can be adduced from a consid-
eration of "imperfect solidarity." In Gay & Co. v. Blanchard, 32 La. Ann. 49
(1880), a purchaser who had assumed the original mortgage debt was re-
leased by the creditor and suit was filed against the first purchaser. The
court stated, "We take the rule to be that where two persons are bound to a
third, for the same debt, and where one of these obligors has upon payment
of the debt, a right of subrogation thereto, and of recourse for the amount
paid, upon his co-debtor, any contract between the creditor and the ultimate
debtor, whereby delay is granted or securities surrendered or diminished,
will discharge the obligor entitled to such recourse and subrogation if his
consent be not obtained. The creditor in such case must maintain a position
that will enable him to subrogate the party paying to all the original rights,
privileges, and actions incident to the debt." This statement was modified on
rehearing to the effect that, "Where the obligors are bound by separate
contracts, the creditor must have accepted both obligations, and be privy to
and have knowledge of the contract out of which grows this right of subroga-
tion." Although a solidary surety's promise is expressly in solido he also
meets the requirements established for imperfect solidarity. Moreover, the
surety's rights in such a situation would not only be ethically grounded, but
also specifically granted by codal provisions. This clearly illustrates the
weakness of any argument that solidarity requires that the surety should
not be entitled to these benefits. It should also be noted that Gay, supra,
19751
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The majority's conclusion that a solidary surety is a prin-
cipal obligor seems unfounded. Solidary debtors need only be
"obliged for the same thing, so that each may be compelled
for the whole. '50 As the earlier jurisprudence realized, this
might be accomplished simply by a waiver of discussion and
division. This result is suggested not only by the literal terms
of article 3045, which equates solidarity with a waiver of
discussion, but also by the location of this article within a
subdivision of the Louisiana Civil Code dealing only with
discussion and division. If the phrase in article 3045 which
alludes to the effect of solidarity were intended to have a
greater effect, it would hardly be expressed as an exception to
an article of such a narrow context. In contrast, the accessory
nature of the surety's contract is reiterated within each sec-
tion of the Louisiana Civil Code dealing with extinction of
obligations.5 To deprive a solidary surety of any more than
discussion and division grants no benefit to the creditor that
he cannot obtain by simply requiring the party to contract as
a principal. It interferes unnecessarily in a situation that
might reflect the actual bargain of the parties and allows a
creditor to defeat his own obligation through the use of
equivocal language. The contract of a solidary surety is acces-
sory by its nature and should remain so even though the
surety be solidarily bound. Likewise, he should be benefitted
by all other terms of his suretyship contract that are not
incompatible with solidarity.
Steve G. Durio
ADMIRALTY: COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN COLLISION CASES
A negligently navigated tanker ran aground on a break-
water which the Coast Guard had failed to illuminate prop-
erly. Although determining that the vessel bore 75% of the
blame and the Coast Guard only 25%, the federal district
court applied the century-old rule of equally divided damages
and ordered the Coast Guard to pay half the vessel's dam-
ages. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,' but on
reaches the same result that would occur should one of the parties be recog-
nized as an accessory.
50. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2091.
51. See, e.g., id. arts 2198, 2205, 2211, 3076, 3060-63.
1. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 497 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir. 1974).
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